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J. RODNEY JOHNSON 
Dispensing with Wills Act Formalities 
for Substantively Valid Wills 
Introduction 
IT is elementary law that, although a writing may have 
been executed in accordance with all of the mechanical 
formalities of the statute ofwills,1 nevertheless the writ-
ing will be denied probate if it is the product of fraud, 
duress or undue influence. And this is the way it ought 
to be, no one should profit by such conduct. But is it not 
an appalling non sequitur to say that, even though clear 
and convincing evidence absolutely (i) negates any fraud, 
duress or undue influence, and (ii) establishes that the 
writing does represent the true testamentary intent of 
its author, nevertheless the writing will be denied pro-
bate solely because it was not executed in accordance 
with these mechanical formalities? 
Our Supreme Court has stated that "(t)he purpose of 
the statutory requirements with respect to the execu-
tion of wills was to throw every safeguard deemed nec-
essary around a testator while in the performance of this 
important act, and to prevent the probate of a fraudu-
lent and suppositious will instead of the real one. To 
effectually accomplish this, the statute must be strictly 
followed (emphasis added)."2 Unfortunately, as a conse-
quence of strictly following the statute, the intended 
means (formalities) to an end (fraud prevention) have 
become ends themselves, and this has resulted in a num-
ber of substantively valid wills3 being sacrificed on the 
alter of formality. This article argues that the time has 
come to stop throwing this baby out with the bath water, 
and it proposes the addition of a new code section that 
would enable courts to admit substantively valid wills 
to probate in clear cases, notwithstanding their failure 
to comply with every formality of the statute. 
A Recent Case 
The recent case of Robinson v. Ward4 serves to illus-
trate one of the formality problems encountered in will 
executions. In this case, testatrix, shortly after becom-
ing "ill with 'a violent headache' ... directed [Katherine 
D.] Ward to obtain 'a legal pad.' ... [And] '(w)rite exact-
ly what I say, and do not interrupt me."5 The first sen-
tence written by Ward, at testatrix' dictation, was "'To 
Katherine D. Ward I leave everything I own for her life 
time."'6 Following the completion of the writing (which 
10 
left the remainder of the estate to charities), testatrix 
"'read it over, signed her name, dated it [May 18, 1986],' 
and 'handed it back' to Ward."7 Shortly thereafter, and 
while Ward was present, testatrix informed a friend that 
she had dictated her will and asked him to "'please read 
it and witness it-which he did.'"8 Testatrix died the fol-
lowing day. 
No issue of fraud, duress or undue influence was raised 
in this case; the trial court found that testatrix had tes-
tamentary capacity; and the parties conceded that the 
writing accurately expressed testatrix' intent. Howev-
er, testatrix' heirs attacked the will on the ground that 
the statute of wills requires attestation by two witness-
es and that Ward's name, written by her only in the 
opening sentence of the will, did not satisfy the statute's 
requirement for a second subscribing witness. Three dis-
senting justices agreed with the heirs. 
But the four-judge majority concurred with the hold-
ing of the trial court that although "'(t)he words "Kather-
ine D. Ward" written by her while not a signature when 
made were sufficient subscription under the unique facts 
of this case to constitute satisfactory compliance with 
the statute in question."'9 In concluding its opinion, the 
majority thought it appropriate to reiterate the follow-
ing policy statement made by the Court in another 4-3 
decision some 137 years earlier: "'Upon the whole, 
... there has been a reasonable and substantial, if not 
a literal, compliance with the requirements of the statute 
shown in this case, sufficient for all practical purposes, 
and which in favor of the testamentary right ought to 
be sustained. To reject the will ... would be ... to sac-
rifice substance to form, and the ends of justice to the 
means by which they are to be accomplished."10 
An Erroneous Premise 
The typical person not encumbered by a legal educa-
tion would probably agree with the outcome of the Robin-
son Case, and might be astonished at the suggestion that 
it could have been otherwise. However, the typical lawyer 
would probably have predicted a different result in Robin-
son, based on American and English precedents in for-
mality cases. Why? Because the rules call for strictly 
following the statute. And why this rule of strict com-
pliance? Because it has long been believed that strict 
compliance with the formalities was the best way to pre-
vent fraud. However, it is submitted that this "strict 
compliance" premise is fundamentally flawed for four 
fundamental reasons. 
First, satisfaction of the statutory requirements is a 
rather simple matter for those who are aware of them, 
and therefore the schemer who seeks to procure a will 
through fraud, duress or undue influence will find it very 
easy to comply with these formalities. Second, none of 
these formalities are required in the case of holograph-
ic wills, and the literature contains no evidence that this 
dispensation has led to an increased incidence of fraud, 
duress or undue influence in such cases. 11 Third, the con-
tinuing revocability of a will is a testator's best protec-
tion against the success of such wrongful conduct. 12 
Fourth, the courts' almost slavish veneration of the canon 
of strict construction has resulted in the destruction of 
countless wills which were free of fraud, duress or undue 
influence. The enormity of this needless destruction has 
caused the leading authority in this area to conclude 
that "(i)n dealing with these botched wills, Anglo-Amer-
ican courts have produced one of the cruelest chapters 
that survives in the common law."13 Thus, it is submit-
ted, the long-standing rule of strict compliance with the 
formalities of the statute of wills as a means of protect-
ing a testator, though well-intentioned, is in fact counter 
productive and ought not to be required when dealing 
with clear cases of substantively valid wills. 
By way of example, let us make a slight change in the 
facts of the Robinson Case that is discussed earlier in 
this article. Suppose that, instead of Katherine Ward, 
the local bishop was the one to whom testatrix dictated 
her will and who was also in the room when the friend 
later read and witnessed it, with all other facts remain-
ing the same. What would be the outcome of the case? 
The equities in favor of the will being admitted to pro-
bate are certainly no less compelling than under the orig-
inal facts. There is still no issue of fraud, duress or undue 
influence in the case; testatrix still has testamentary 
capacity; and the parties still concede that the writing 
accurately expresses testatrix' intent. Indeed, the layper-
son might see this as a stronger case for probate than 
the original facts because the interposition of the bish-
op, who is not a beneficiary, has eliminated any possi-
ble lingering concern about Katherine Ward serving as 
drafter/beneficiary/witness. But it is clear that this will 
would now be denied probate. Even the most benevolent 
court, applying an extremely liberal "substantial com-
pliance" test, would be powerless to salvage this will-
there is simply no way to get around the absence of a 
second witness subscribing in testatrix' presence. And 
therein lies the reason why progressing from a strict 
compliance to a substantial compliance rule is not suf-
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ficient; the needed remedy is a dispensation power that 
will enable a court to probate a substantively valid will 
even though one or more of the statutory formalities is 
entirely absent. 
Non-Probate Matters 
For many years a will was the only vehicle available 
for making a testamentary disposition of property. Tech-
nically speaking, it still is. However numerous probate 
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avoidance mechanisms are available to the consumer in 
today's commercial market that enable one to make a 
de facto, if not a de Jure, testamentary transfer of an 
unlimited amount of property, whether real or person-
al, tangible or intangible. Immediately coming to mind 
are such mechanisms as insurance policy beneficiary 
designations; joint or tenants by the entirety deeds to 
real estate with survivorship; joint, Totten Trust, and 
POD bank accounts; revocable and irrevocable inter vivos 
trusts; pension plan, IRA, and deferred compensation 
plan beneficiary designations; joint and survivor own-
ership of stocks, bonds, and brokerage accounts; life 
estate and remainder deeds to real estate; etc. It is instruc-
tive to note that none of these methods of transfer are 
surrounded with the number and variety of"safeguards" 
that are inflicted upon wills and that, where safeguards 
do exist, substantial compliance or dispensation is the 
rule of the day instead of strict compliance. 
Why this dispensation from such formalities for non-
probate transfers? It certainly cannot be because these 
transactions are insignificant in terms of total wealth 
or number of transactions. Statistics are not at hand but 
it is believed the reader will admit the likelihood that 
the value of all non-probate transfers exceeds the value 
of property passing under wills, 14 and it can not be denied 
that the total of such transactions will exceed the num-
ber of wills actually admitted to probate by a significant 
multiple. 15 It is believed that the dispensation for non-
probate transfers probably occurred as a con~equence of 
experience, business practices, and market forces sug-
gesting to the legal and business community that such 
excessive safeguards were both undesirable and unnec-
essary. But, regardless of the cause, the point to be made 
is that the dispensation has occurred. And again, as in 
the case of holographic wills cited above, the literature 
contains no evidence that this dispensation has created 
an increased incidence of attempted fraud, duress or 
undue influence in these areas. 
A concern for protection against fraudulently alleged 
promises in a number of other inter vivos transactions 
resulted in the enactment of a statute of frauds at com-
mon law and in every American jurisdiction. Notwith-
standing the universality of this concern, however, no 
jurisdiction's statute of frauds imposes the extensive 
restrictions that are found in the statute of wills. Gen-
erally speaking, the statute of frauds provides a defense 
against the enforcement of a promise in one of the pre-
scribed categories unless the promise is (i) evidenced by 
a writing (ii) signed by the party to be charged. Of par-
ticular interest is the fact that both of these require-
ments may be dispensed with and an oral contract can 
be enforced under the doctrine of part performance. A 
reference to the annotations under Virginia Code §11-2 
will give an indication of the settled nature of this dis-
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pensation and the number of its applications. Why this 
dispensation from the statutory safeguards under the 
statute of frauds? Because (i) the part performance estab-
lishes an equity on behalf of the performing party and, 
most importantly, (ii) the part performance tends to sat-
isfy the goal of the statute by providing proof of the exis-
tence of the alleged promise. This is the substantive or 
goal-oriented type of solution that is denied under the 
statute of wills where, even though evidence would show 
satisfaction of the goal of the statute (no fraud, duress 
or undue influence), probate will be denied unless one 
has strictly complied with the specified means to that 
goal. Before leaving the statute of frauds, and the relat-
ed statute of conveyances, it should also be noted that 
the Virginia General Assembly never saw fit to enact 
that part of the English legislation that made the statute 
of frauds applicable to oral trusts of real estate. Trusts 
are another form of will substitute, and it is clear that 
oral trusts in realty, as well as personalty, are permit-
ted in Virginia. 16 No specific formality is required and 
the oral trust is enforceable if its terms are established 
by clear and convincing evidence. But, suppose the exact 
same terms of such an enforceable oral will-substitute 
were typed in a testamentary paper that was also signed 
by its author and notarized. Now the writing has become 
unenforceable. The additional fact that the writing's pro-
ponent can provide clear and convincing evidence of 
intent, terms, and lack of fraud would not be enough for 
its probate-strict compliance with the formalities of the 
statute of wills must be demonstrated, and the writing 
in question has only one witness (the notary). Although 
no responsible estate planner would recommend that a 
client use an oral trust as a will-substitute, the illus-
tration demonstrates the inconsistency of Virginia law 
in parallel matters where the ultimate issue (protection 
from fraud) is the same. 
There is a final consideration that might be raised 
from a public policy standpoint, even though it is not a 
property matter. In certain extreme cases, Virginia crim-
inal law provides for the possibility of capital punish-
ment. However, prior to depriving one ofhis life, the law 
demands that his commission of the alleged crime be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt-but it does not spec-
ify what evidence must be used to prove it. There is no 
capital offense which, like a will, must be proved by two 
eyewitnesses. As an original proposition, how does one 
explain a system oflaws that will sanction the taking of 
a person's life without a single eyewitness, but will not 
sanction the probate of his signed and substantively 
valid typewritten will unless there are two eyewitness-
es (who also subscribe their signatures thereto in the 
person's presence)? 
Revocation-A Parallel Concern 
The preceding will-execution discussion is also rele-
vant in will-revocation cases because, in addition to revo-
cation by physical act, Virginia law provides for revocation 
of a will by a writing executed "in the manner in which 
a will is required to be executed,'"7 thereby incorporat-
ing by reference the execution formalities of the statute 
of wills into revocation cases. This incorporation carries 
with it the concept of strict compliance with these for-
malities, as demonstrated by a leading national case 
from Virginia, Thompson v. Royall. '8 In this case the tes-
tatrix, in the presence of her attorney, the executor named 
in her will, and a third party, told her attorney to destroy 
her will and a codicil thereto. Her attorney suggested 
that it might be better to revoke by a writing, instead of 
by destruction, so that the original text might be avail-
able for possible assistance in writing any future will. 
Upon testatrix' agreement, her attorney wrote the fol-
lowing words upon the back of the will's manuscript 
cover: "This will null and void and to be only held by [the 
executor], instead of being destroyed, as a memorandum 
for another will if I desire to make same. This 19 Sept 
1932."19 After her attorney had completed this writing 
on her behalf, testatrix signed it. Testatrix died thirteen 
days later. 
These facts were uncontroverted, and no issue of intent, 
capacity, fraud, duress, or undue influence was raised 
in the ensuing litigation to determine the efficacy of tes-
tatrix' intended revocation. If the notations had been 
written by testatrix, instead of by her attorney, they 
would have qualified as effective holographic revoca-
tions. But, as the writings were not in her hand, the revo-
cation statute (incorporating the wills' act formalities) 
required her signature to be attested in her presence by 
two subscribing witnesses. As testatrix' signature wasn't 
so witnessed, the attempted written revocation clearly 
failed. This case further serves to demonstrate how deeply 
the rule of strict compliance is entrenched, because the 
lack of compliance was so obvious in this case that coun-
sel on appeal did not even attempt to argue the issue.20 
Again the question is asked-Why must it be so? What 
aspect of the law is being served by such results? Assum-
ing for the sake of argument that strict compliance with 
these formalities was required by the necessities of an 
earlier day when wills were frequently deathbed-docu-
ments, it is submitted that the time has now arrived to 
grant the courts a dispensation power. Such a dispen-
sation power would allow the courts to waive statutory 
formalities in execution and revocation cases where peti-
tioner establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
the writing accurately expresses its author's intent, that 
its author had the required capacity, and that it was not 
the product of fraud, duress or undue influence. 
The Proposed Remedy 
Following up on a recommendation made by the Nation-
al Advisory Committee on Uniform State Laws several 
years earlier, the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws added a new Section 2-503 
to the Uniform Probate Code as a part of its 1990 revi-
sion. The text of this section, as modified to fit in the 
Code ofVirginia,21 reads as follows: 
§64.1-_. Writings intended as wills, etc.-
Although a document or writing added upon a 
document was not executed in compliance with 
§64.1-49, the document or writing is treated as 
ifit had been executed in compliance with that 
section if the proponent of the document or writ-
ing establishes by clear and convincing evidence 
that the decedent intended the document or 
writing to constitute (i) the decedent's will, (ii) 
a partial or complete revocation of the will, (iii) 
an addition to or an alteration of the will, or (iv) 
a partial or complete revival of his [or her] for-
merly revoked will or of a formerly revoked por-
tion of the will. 
The remedy granted by this section is appli-
cable only in proceedings before the court; it is 
not applicable in proceedings before clerks or 
their deputies. 
This section shall apply to all documents and 
writings of decedents dying after June 30, 1992, 
regardless of when such documents or writings 
came into existence. 
It is submitted that the rather straight forward lan-
guage of this dispensation power represents an excel-
lent solution to the problem at hand. It does not eliminate 
any of the formalities as such, and its existence will not 
cause any relaxation of existing will execution practices 
by knowledgeable attorneys. Lawyers who are aware of 
the formalities will continue to do their best to strictly 
follow them in order that their wills might continue to 
qualify for the informal ex parte probate that is avail-
able in the clerk's office. However the document not so 
executed, because of a lack of awareness of the formal-
ities (whether by counsel or consumer), would not nec-
essarily be fatally flawed as is presently the case. The 
dispensation statute would allow the proponent of this 
paper the opportunity to prove, by clear and convincing 
evidence, what would be presumed if the statutory 
requirements had been met. And, if such clear proof was 
forthcoming it would demonstrate that the underlying 
purpose or goal of the statute of wills had been served 
and thus justify the admission of the document to pro-
bate. 
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Application and History 
How far might the courts go in dispensing with statu-
tory formalities if such a statute is passed? First, it is 
clear that the statute requires that there always be a 
writing. Could the court dispense with the testator's sig-
nature? Literally, yes, but it is not expected that this 
would occur often because of the difficulty in proving by 
clear and convincing evidence that an unsigned paper 
was intended to be a final legal document. There are the 
clear, if unlikely, cases mentioned by Professor Lang-
bein where one with pen poised to execute a will is felled 
by a coronary or an assassin's bullet. A more realistic 
instance where signature dispensation might occur is 
the surprisingly large number of cases where wills pre-
pared for husband and wife are reversed during the sign-
ing ceremony and each signs the other's will. 22 A second 
instance in which signature dispensation might occur is 
where a will is to be made self-proving and, although 
the self-proving affidavit is signed by the testator and 
witnesses, the signature lines on the will itself are left 
blank. In other cases, the difficulty of proving finality of 
an unsigned document by clear and convincing evidence 
is likely to be fatal. Accordingly, the greatest opportu-
nity to use the dispensation power can be expected to 
arise in the attestation cases involving number of wit-
nesses, signatures of witnesses, testator signing in wit-
nesses' presence, and witnesses signing in testator's 
presence. 
There may be a concern that the enactment of a dis-
pensation statute could stimulate a significant amount 
of needless probate litigation, with numerous potential 
"beneficiaries" besieging the courts with a variety of 
alleged testamentary writings. Although no American 
jurisdiction has thus far adopted such a statute, the evi-
dence is all to the contrary from several foreign juris-
dictions that have. Israel enacted a dispensation statute 
in 1965, followed by South Australia in 1975, and both 
of these statutes are similar to the one contained in the 
1990 Uniform Probate Code that is set forth in this arti-
cle. After studying the results in these countries, the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws concluded as follows: 
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Experience in Israel and South Australia 
strongly supports the view that a dispensing 
power like Section 2-503 will not breed litiga-
tion. Indeed, as an Israeli judge reported to the 
British Columbia Law Reform Commission, the 
dispensing power 'actually prevents a great deal 
of unnecessary litigation,' because it eliminates 
disputes about technical lapses and limits the 
zone of the dispute to the functional question 
of whether the instrument correctly expresses 
the testator's intent.23 
Professor Langbein concludes this aspect of his exhaus-
tive report of South Australia's experience by noting that 
"the litigation levels have been astonishingly low. The 
reform has not engendered trumped-up claims."24 
Conclusion 
This article's thesis is that if it can be established by 
clear and convincing evidence (i) that a writing was 
intended to be a will, (ii) that the putative testator had 
the requisite capacity, and (iii) that the writing was not 
the product of fraud, duress or undue influence, then the 
writing ought to be admitted to probate as a will, even 
though it might fail to comply with some of the formal-
ities contained in the statute of wills. Those who accept 
this thesis will agree that the present practice ofrequir-
ing strict compliance with the formalities of the statute 
of wills is a dysfunctional aspect of the wealth transfer 
process that should be eliminated. It is submitted that 
(i) a dispensation power like that contained in the Uni-
form Probate Code is the only realistic solution to this 
problem, and that (ii) the courts of the Commonwealth 
can be trusted to exercise such a power with the same 
discernment they presently exercise in the numerous 
other instances where they have extensive control over 
the life, liberty and fortunes of the people. Accordingly, 
the language of the dispensation statute included here-
in is respectfully submitted to the Virginia General 
Assembly for its consideration in the 1992 Session. 
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